Cyber Black Box/Event Data Recorder: Legal and Ethical Perspectives and Challenges with Digital Forensics by Losavio, Michael et al.
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 10 Number 4 Article 4 
2015 
Cyber Black Box/Event Data Recorder: Legal and Ethical 
Perspectives and Challenges with Digital Forensics 
Michael Losavio 
University of Louisville 
Pavel Pastukov 
Perm State National Research University 
Svetlana Polyakova 
Perm State National Research University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Losavio, Michael; Pastukov, Pavel; and Polyakova, Svetlana (2015) "Cyber Black Box/Event Data Recorder: 
Legal and Ethical Perspectives and Challenges with Digital Forensics," Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law: Vol. 10 : No. 4 , Article 4. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2015.1210 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol10/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
(c)ADFSL 
Cyber Black Box/Event Data Recorder: Legal and Ethical Perspectives … JDFSL V10N4
© 2015 ADFSL Page 43
CYBER BLACK BOX/EVENT DATA RECORDER:
LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES AND
CHALLENGES WITH DIGITAL FORENSICS
Michael Losavio
University of Louisville
Department of Criminal Justice
Louisville, Kentucky 40292 U.S.A.
michael.losavio@louisville.edu
Pavel Pastukov
Perm State National Research University
Department of Criminal Procedure and Criminalistics
Perm, Russian Federation
pps64@mail.ru
Svetlana Polyakova
Perm State National Research University
Department of English Language and Intercultural Communication
Perm, Russian Federation
polsvetlana@yandex.ru
ABSTRACT
With ubiquitous computing and the growth of the Internet of Things, there is vast expansion in
the deployment and use of event data recording systems in a variety of environments. From the
ships’ logs of antiquity through the evolution of personal devices for recording personal and
environmental activities, these devices offer rich forensic and evidentiary opportunities that smash
against rights of privacy and personality. The technical configurations of these devices provide for
greater scope of sensing, interconnection options for local, near, and cloud storage of data, and the
possibility of powerful analytics. This creates the unique situation of near-total data profiles on
the lives of others. We examine legal and ethical issues of such in the American and transnational
environment.
Keywords: event, data, recorder, legal, ethical, privacy
INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics is the search for reliable
evidence within electronic information. One
problem that has been characterized as the
“terabyte problem” is that the size of a data
corpus may grow beyond that which can be
properly analyzed forensically. But the inverse
of this is that within these massive data
collections we have far more information on
the lives of others than in the past and subject
to examination in ways never before previously
possible.
This implicates serious issues of the nature
of personal privacy and autonomy within the
processes of digital forensics. These issues, in
turn, may challenge the foundational legal
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principles of states protecting those interests,
foremost among them for the American polity
being the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and the right it guarantees
its citizens that they will be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures by the
state.
The information of the lives of people is
generated in and through many roles. These
can be considered as nodes tied to the different
domains of basic life activities and functions:
Personal Life
Work Life
Home Life
Transport
Social Life
(Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014).
Each of these may overlap with others.
Each may generate precise data from which a
detailed and granular life profile is painted.
This data may connect an individual with
location, transactions, activity, time and
proximity. The legal implications of this should
be anticipated and addressed.
The growth in “Event Data Recorders”
(EDR) in all forms and sizes produces special
challenges for the forensic collection of this
information. The political debates regarding
the technical factors of encryption and data
protection in such devices are built on
fundamental questions of law and ethics that
should be considered as part of the analysis of
any technical implementations.
From ancient times people have sought to
memorialize their travels, whether with the
ancient Greek periplus or English sea captain's
rutter. These served as accounts of travels and
guides for the future, like the personal journals
kept by travelers. These media required the
survival of the medium and, usually, the
author to make their way to others and inform
the general world. With the ship lost at sea, so
often would the journals of crew and
passengers pass into the deep, with nothing to
tell of their passing.
The evolution of transportation systems
was matched by the evolution of methods to
record transportation activities. The increasing
capital costs for transportation systems and
the commensurately greater damage they could
do upon failure may have been an impetus for
this. Train event recorders were introduced in
the late 19th century to record time and speed
data on locomotives (HaslerRail, 2015).
With the deployment of the first jet
airliners came efforts to record and preserve
information that might explain the cause or
causes of catastrophic airplane crashes.
Australian David Warren developed his “Flight
Memory Unit” as a way to record the voice of
the pilots and flight instrument data to help
determine the cause of a crash (Paur, 2010).
The first versions of the device were produced
in 1957, to objections that their use would
constitute an invasion of privacy. Australia
was the first country to require the use of these
devices in crash and fireproof containers.
The experience of the aviation industry
with the black box showed its utility in both
resolving the causes of aviation incidents and
directing efforts to enhance safety and
reliability in aviation transport. It is a model
that has expanded into other areas of
transportation.
With the development of cost-effective
technologies for event data recording, the use
of these devices expanded into other
transportation technologies. Commercial
transport companies began to use EDR devices
to monitor work performance and as evidence
in accident reconstruction cases. Beginning in
the mid-1990s similar instrumentation was
mandated in the United States for all new car
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sold in the domestic market. These matched
use of On-Board Diagnostic computers (OBD)
for monitoring and evaluating engine condition
and operations.
More extensive data recording was
implemented in automobiles through EDR
devices that were also called “black boxes.” The
EDR devices began to collect additional
information regarding vehicle activity and
performance which would then be preserved for
later analysis.
The US regulatory agency for vehicle
traffic systems, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), set out
through regulation the required types of data
the systems must collect, the format and the
durability and survivability of the recordation
medium (49 CFR Part 563, 2015). Vehicle
systems and data opportunities are also
created by the global positioning satellite
systems and communications systems, such as
cellular phones, used in vehicles. These devices
may provide information directly to EDR
recorders or may independently preserve that
information in their own systems.
Video of vehicle and external activity can
also be captured and stored, revealing events
that occurred at key times within the vehicle.
Apps are now available to use a cellular
Android phone to collect vehicle event data
and video (AutoGuard Dash Cam, 2015).
This is a data space for transportation
systems that while once autonomous are now
subject to the collection of significant amounts
of data at a consumer level rather than only at
the level of mass transportation.
Paralleling this is the rise of hyper-personal
instrumentation through smart phones and
peripheral devices that can log in record
massive amounts of information about the lives
of individuals. This data can range from key
GPS locational data to health and physical
activity information to journal information
from the device user in text, audio and video
forms.
Given the interconnected nature of such
systems, this, too, creates a huge data corpus
that may be both resident locally on an
individual system as well as in storage in the
cloud.
The advantage of a highly interconnected
set of event data recording systems is
preservation through real-time backup of key
data maintained in the cloud rather than just
locally. This debate is a result, in part, of the
Air France and Malaysian air disasters for
which forensically useful event data could not
be retrieved or was never found.
This highlights the twin challenges of
forensic accessibility in these highly mobile
devices and the intense privacy concerns which
may now accompany the profiles of people in
ways never before possible. We explore these
issues.
PERSONAL AND
AUTOMOTIVE EDR
SYSTEMS
Americans have a deep affection for two
particular pieces of their technology, their
cellular telephones and their automobiles.
Given the central role these play in their lives
and the immense data about those lives the
systems can generate, they’ve come to play key
roles in legal and judicial resolution of issues in
people’s lives, whether from accidents,
infidelity or crime. Given the questions raised
as to privacy and who really “owns” the data
about someone’s life, naturally leads to legal
and policy challenges. Details of these legal
and policy concerns are detailed below.
Automotive Data Systems
As automotive data systems pull data from
sensors within the vehicle, they collect panoply
of information that can, in turn, offer guidance
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as to what a driver has been doing and what
the driver may have done prior to an incident.
For the OBD/EDR (Event Data Recorders)
data that may be collected include vehicle
status, airbag deployment speed, seatbelt
usage, acceleration, and braking. In one case
the lieutenant governor of Massachusetts was
fined after an accident where the “black box”
recording showed he was driving 100 mph; this
also led to a police retraction of an earlier
report that the cause of the accident was due
to ice on the road (Bierman, 2012).
The growth in hands-free messaging and
telephony, GPS navigation systems and
onboard Internet access provide even vaster
onboard information regarding the activities of
the vehicle and of the driver. The hands-free
telephone and messaging collects and tracks
telephone and contact numbers called,
messages and texts, often with metadata
showing the times such communications were
made and whether incoming or outgoing. The
GPS navigation systems store trip data, home
site and backtrack data of route taken. These
provide forensic opportunities where such data
analysis is necessary.
Forensic use of this data, from
investigation to litigation has been growing,
such as in investigation and the prosecution
and defense of vehicular homicide cases where
it has been called “an unbiased witness to the
truth”. (Sharp, 2003) Vehicle manufacturers
themselves have used the data in civil
litigation where they are the defendants to
show that, in fact, user error was the cause of
an accident rather than a vehicle failure
(Batiste v. General Motors Corporation,
2001). Data correlation of cell phone text use
in vehicular homicide cases involving teenagers
led to a nationwide movement to legally
prohibit and socially disapprove of texting
while driving in the United States.
Personal Data Systems
This scales up in terms of the scope and
diversity of data collected with personal
cellular phones: indeed, 64% of U.S. residents
own “smartphones” with advanced capabilities.
(Smith, 2015) “Smart phones” and their sensors
can collected data on physical movement,
location, transportation, sound, images and
physiological parameters; enhanced features
can collect a wider variety of actions and
conditions, including personal health
information. (Cnossen, 2015) Health futurists
see opportunities to link this mobile data with
genetic, medical and environmental (physical,
social, behavioral) data for both research and
personal health improvement.
Cellular telephones store the data lives of
their holders in ways never imagined. In turn,
they have become the darlings of the
evidentiary and forensic communities, whether
for criminal investigation or preparation for
divorce court. Some have characterized the
user’s smart phone as “the single most valuable
new police tool.” (Kaste, 2014). One study of a
newly introduced digital forensics capacity to a
small city police force found that the
examination of cellular telephones quickly
outstripped the need for forensic examination
of computing devices. This department’s data
indicated, inter alia, the expanding useful of
cell phones a as evidence sources in more and
more traditional areas of law enforcement, as
seen in Table 1 (Losavio, Keeling, Lemon,
2012).
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Table 1
Comparison of Numbers of Devices Examined (2012 SADFE/UNESCO Conference)
Sept. 2011
- July 2012 # Computers
# Cell phones
(SIMs included) Other
September 6
October 5 18 1
November 5
December 7
January 2 1
February 3 13 7
March 2 10 3
April 9 4
May 1 4 3
June 2 9 2
July 1 5 2
totals 14 88 22
EVOLUTION OF
AMERICAN LEGAL
STANDARDS FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF
EVENT DATA
Although there is a growing body of case law
regarding conduct with automobile event data
recorders, the pervasiveness of cell phones has
put them in the lead for creating the legal
conflicts that generate case law under
American law.
Part of the legal and ethical conflicts
relate to privacy (Mueller, 2006). This data
can reveal a great deal about a person’s
activities. One United States Supreme Court
justice, in commenting on the nature of GPS
monitoring in the case of United States v.
Jones observed that such tracking could reveal
family, professional, and many other types of
associations all based around locational data
(United States v. Jones, 2012).
The legal issues relating to cyber black box
data collection fit within the framework of
privacy rights as established under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits a state
seizure or search absent probable cause that
evidence of a crime is present and that a
judicial warrant for that search or seizure is
issued by a neutral magistrate. There are a
variety of exceptions to this based on
balancing issues of public safety against the
privacy rights of the individual. A warrantless
search is reasonable only if it falls within a
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specific exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement.
But several justices in the Jones case
observed that GPS tracking with electronic
aggregation and analysis created a radically
different technology and scale of data profiling
that presented special issues needing
resolution.
These issues of technology and scale are
clearly presented by the nature of data
collection for the cyber Black box. The
foundational cases in the United States that
begin this analysis are the 2014 Supreme Court
opinions of United States v. Wurie and Riley v.
California. The Supreme Court discussed the
massive amounts of information which
electronic devices can store such that there
would be a reasonable expectation of privacy
in such devices that should not be violated
where they are seized as part of an arrest of a
suspect. This doctrine allowed officers of the
state to circumvent the Fourth Amendment
protective requirement of a warrant to search
issued by a neutral magistrate based upon a
finding of probable cause that evidence of a
crime would be found. It allowed for a great
deal of police intrusion into private affairs were
there were no other legal grounds pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment.
At issue in these cases was the data stored
in that most popular of portable personal data
devices, the cell phone. Under prior case law, a
person placed under arrest could be searched
and the things found on them searched under
the doctrine known as “search incident to an
arrest.”
But the challenge presented in diverse
cases across the country was whether or not
this doctrine could withstand the changes in
technology where so much, if not most of a
person’s life might be found in that personal
device.
The legal principles and policy concerns at
issue in a search incident to an arrest doctrine
were 1) need to protect a police officer from an
arrestee, 2) the need to protect potential
evidence that might be destroyed by an
arrestee and 3) the counterbalancing privacy
interest of the person being arrested. The
Supreme Court observed that deviations from
the warrant requirement might be justified
only by first “…assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests.,” citing
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300.
In conducting its analysis the Supreme
Court found that the cell phone device did not
create a risk or danger to a police officer
during the arrest. Further, it found that there
was no danger of the destruction of evidence
once the device was secured from the arrestee.
This then was weighed against the massive
amounts of information now stored in these
devices. Given this technical change in privacy
interests weighing heavily in favor of the
individual, the Supreme Court held that the
search of the device could only be done once a
warrant had been secured after finding of
probable cause that it contained evidence of a
crime is determined by neutral magistrate.
Given the nature of this data and the
personal information it may reflect, this will
have an impact regarding the necessity of
search warrants for the seizure of such
information or some kind of court process
regarding its access. This invokes the panoply
of Fourth Amendment requirements to justify
a state seizure of this information.
This application of these basic legal
principles can be applied to other areas as to
the seizure of information.
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The “Automobile Exception,”
Cell Phones and Auto Event
Data Recorders
The special legal principles at issue in the
“automobile exception” to the requirement of a
warrant in order to seize and search at
automobile are built around the concepts that
1) the automobile is mobile and may easily
move beyond investigative jurisdiction, 2) it is
out in the public and thus subject to a lesser
expectation of privacy and 3) it is subject to
government regulation which, again, reduces
the level of expectation of privacy.
This has implications for automobile event
data recorders, particularly where they have
been involved in activities such as an
automobile collision or traffic violation where
probable cause exists to believe the EDR
contains evidence relating to a crime. This may
apply equally to cell phones to the extent that
they are highly mobile with some aspects of
action in public. The split with traditional
search and seizure doctrine is that implied by
Wurie and Riley is that while these devices
may be seized, they may not be searched
without first applying for a warrant. While this
may seem to be only a technical issue, a
neutral magistrate’s evaluation of the
sufficiency of the basis for probable cause may
differ from that of investigating police officer.
These facts raise issues as to the right of a
police officer to search an event data recorder
after a collision or traffic violation. The officer
may have a right to seize or otherwise preserve
the data in the EDR if there is a reasonable
threat that the information may be destroyed
or lost; that officer would then have an
obligation to timely seek search warrant to
examine it for information. If the vehicle has
been legally abandoned or turned over to the
custody of others, then there may not be
Fourth Amendment implications for the
examination of the data if that device is no
longer legally in the possession of the
automobile’s owner. The seizure of the vehicle
by police may raise additional issues, as
discussed in the section on inventory searches,
below.
Increasingly other privacy-protecting legal
restrictions may apply that limit access to the
information, such as statutory limitations or
requirements for consent or a court order even
where the vehicle is no longer physically under
the control of the owner (California Vehicle
Code § 9951(c)(2), 2015) (People v. Xinos,
2011).
Exigent Circumstances
The exigent circumstances exception
essentially permits seizures and searches under
and objectively reasonable determination that
emergency circumstances justify the action,
even if the emergency circumstances or the
result of a police officer’s unlawful actions.
Those emergency circumstances are such that
there is probable cause that evidence relating
to a crime will be found and an urgent and
compelling risk of the destruction of evidence,
the escape of a suspect or of a danger to the
police officers or others. (Kentucky v. King,
2011) (Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 2006)
This particular exception to the
requirement that the police obtained a warrant
was not directly addressed by the holdings in
Wurie and Riley. But it does implicate factual
considerations that an emergency access to
those event data recording devices would
reasonably permit the preservation of evidence,
the prevention of an escape of a suspect or the
mitigation of danger to police officers or
others.
One scenario raised in Wurie is that the
cell phone might be used to summon
individuals in support of the arrestee,
presenting a danger to the officers. While the
court dismissed that argument in that the
arrestee no longer had possession of the cell
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phone, it is possible that, depending on the
circumstances, a cell phone may have
immediate information relating to a warning to
a suspect to flee, direction to destroy evidence
or create a danger of injury to the police or
others. If an officer can make the case that
such evidence may be found in a device to
support one of these conclusions, then a seizure
and search without a warrant could be justified
as an exigent circumstance. This may be as
simple as checking a phone log to see who or
what was called or texted immediately before
an individual’s encounter with the police.
Examples where exigent circumstances may
exist include the discovery or seizure of these
devices in relation to an ongoing crime, such as
a violent robbery, child abduction or the
deployment of “weapons of mass destruction”;
where there may be multiple criminal actors
and an immediate risk of injury to others, the
accessing of data showing immediate past
activity and ongoing communications with
others could be time critical for the prevention
of death or injury.
Inventory Searches
The inventory search exception is built around
policy principles of protecting the property of
an arrestee as well as protecting state
authorities from claims of damage or theft of
property seized from an arrestee. (Colorado v.
Bertine, 1987) It requires that there be defined
and written limits on police discretion in
searching and inventory search must be done
pursuant to standard policies and procedures.
Given the policy grounds for the protection of
property and of the police from claims of
damage to property, the reasoning in Wurie
and Riley would indicate that the seizure and
inventory search would be limited to the
device itself and not permit an examination of
the contents. To the extent of avoiding claims
of damage the electronic information therein,
the device could be placed in a protective bag;
indeed, given the impact of search on a device
and its contents it would be safer to not search
the device as part of an inventory search
absent a warrant.
Border Searches
Traditionally, anything can be searched
crossing international borders; traditional
Fourth Amendment protections did not apply,
including as to computing devices.
But evolving case law within certain
federal circuits, particularly the federal Ninth
Circuit, have begun to limit that action absent
“reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity
(United States v. Cotterman, 2013) This
reflects the same concerns as seen in Wurie
and Riley that the sheer amount of
information at issue may reduce the rights of
intrusion and examination of devices that are
collected such globally vast amounts of
information. This doctrine will continue to
evolve nationally and reflects the changing
nature of technological systems for personal
data recording, data encryption technologies
and automated analytics of those devices.
This, too, reflects the radical change in
both globalization of economies and portability
of these powerful technological systems.
Mandatory searches of computers and cell
phones have been permitted where external
information showed an individual had visited
sites frequented for pedophilia sex tourism. But
those devices might only contain personal
information or trade and business secrets
information unrelated to any crime but which
are necessary for global activities. The trend
does appear to require some facts that make it
reasonable to intrude into these devices.
Investigative Detention
(Terry Stop & Frisk)
One case law doctrine regards the ability of
police to stop and “frisk” a subject on grounds
less than probable cause that they have
engaged in criminal activity. That standard,
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similar to that adopted within the border
search law, is that the police officer have a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may
be afoot and that, for the frisk, that the
individual possesses a weapon. The extension
in the case of data devices, again, might be a
reasonable suspicion that a data device has
been used in such a way as to create an
immediate risk to an officer. This would be a
greater extension of search rights that
currently exist, and would seem to be contrary
to the trend in greater data protection in data
devices.
But this does fit within general
investigative practices whereby the frisk does
provide the officer with an additional bit of
information regarding the subject, to wit, they
have a cell phone. If that can be combined
with other evidence it may lead to further
actions by the police, such as extending the
detention and questioning and, if sufficient
information develops to establish probable
cause, obtained a search warrant.
Practically, the discovery of the personal
EDR device may lead to a police officer asking
for consent to search the device, which a
person may agree to under the stress of the
moment.
Consent
Lastly, an investigative standby of great utility
has been the consent search. Any individual
may consent to the search of their data
devices, regardless of whether a police officer
has any suspicion of improper activity. It can
be quite intimidating to have an officer asked
to examine your device and have to make the
decision as to whether to say yes or no to that
request; indeed, there are many cases involving
consent searches producing vast amounts of
evidence of criminal activity. This particular
exception also holds true for event data
recorders of any kind. The one item to note is
that once consent is given it may be
withdrawn an individual can at that point
terminate the search. But if an investigating
officer has found evidence relating to criminal
activity then, then the device may be seized for
the preservation of evidence and, possibly, for
actions under other exceptions to the search
warrant requirement. But having once seized
the device, if evidence of criminal activity is
found then that should be sufficient for a
presentation to a neutral magistrate to get a
search warrant for the full examination of the
device.
Table 2 summarizes possible changes in
practice.
JDFSL V10N4 Cyber Black Box/Event Data Recorder: Legal and Ethical Perspectives …
Page 52 © 2015 ADFSL
Table 2
Fourth Amendment issues with EDR
Exception Requirements Changes in lawful practicepossible
Search Incident to Arrest Contemporaneous with lawful arrest Limitedto “grabbing space” Yes
The “Automobile” Exception Mobile vehicle, probable cause Yes
Exigent Circumstances Exigency, Objectively Reasonable Basis Probably not
Inventory Searches Lawful seizure Probably not
Border Searches Yes
Investigative Detention (Terry Stop) Reasonable suspicion Probably not
Consent A legal consensual encounter No
Collateral Civil Liability for
Errors
There may be civil issues regarding liability for
an invasion of privacy under both statutory
protections and American common-law.
There have been efforts on a federal and
state levels to provide notice to people that an
event data recorder is present in recording
specific types of information, which may be
used in law enforcement proceedings and that
the event data recorder in the data on it are
the property of the owner of the automobile
such that the retrieval of that information by
any person anyone else is unlawful except with
the owner’s consent, a court order or the
servicing of the vehicle by a dealer or
automotive technician.
Some proposed protective legislation has
not yet been enacted into law (H.R. 2414-
Black Box Privacy Protection Act, US, 2013)
Another proposed law establishes that the data
in an EDR required to be installed under
Department of Transportation regulations are
the property of the owner or lessee of the
vehicle and may not be accessed other than
through a court or judicial/administrative
order authorizing data retrieval according to
law, the consent of the owner, retrieval
Pursuant to Authorized Investigations of the
National Transportation Safety Board or the
Department of Transportation, pursuant to an
appropriate for the emergency medical
response in a motor vehicle crash or for traffic
safety research where the owner or lessee’s
personally identifiable information and vehicle
identification number or not disclosed (S.766 -
Driver Privacy Act of 2015, US).
There may be the risk of civil liability for a
digital forensics examiner looking at such data
devices where the legal right to conduct such
an examination has not been established. It
continues to be a good practice to require
documentation of a legal seizure and right to
search of any particular medium for
conducting the examination.
TRANSNATIONAL
CONCERNS-RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
Video event data recorders (VEDR) are widely
deployed in the Russian Federation by
everyday drivers, capturing images while
driving, including before and after traffic
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accidents. This is particularly valuable data
that may be used for multiple purposes; in one
case it was used for the diagnosis of an
epileptic seizure that occurred in a taxi driver
at the time of an automobile accident (Kotaro,
et al. 2014).
When considering the issues raised in these
technologies-legal, ethical, political-we may
also look to how other governments approach
these matters. Truth versus personal autonomy
is, or should be, a matter of concern for all
polities.
Police in the Russian Federation apply for
electronic reception of documents and data in
cooperation with other law enforcement
agencies, state and municipal authorities,
public associations and organizations.
Police utilize technical means such as
audio, photo and video for documenting the
circumstances of  crimes, circumstances of
accidents, including in public places
(administrative offenses), as well as to monitor
(register) the actions of police officers
performing their duties (Art. 11) (On Police:
Federal Law of 07.02.2011 N 3 –FZ of the
Russian Federation).
In accordance with Art.2.6.7 of the
Administrative Code of the Russian Federation
administration of police use of special technical
means is reflected in the record of an
administrative offense or the judgment in the
case of an administrative offense. (Russian
Federation Code of Administrative Offences of
30.12.2001).
Under Art. 2.6.1. of the Russian Federation
Code of Administrative Offences
administrative liability is enforced on the
owners of vehicles for administrative violations
in traffic and administrative violations in
landscaping that are committed with the use of
the vehicles. In these cases the recordation of
activity of these administrative offenses is done
by automatic mode using special means (event
data recorders). These devices function
through photographing and filming, recording,
or by means of photography and filming, by
the video recorders in vehicles.
The owner of the vehicle is exempt from
administrative liability if, during the
examination of the application for a ruling on
the administrative case, it is established that
at the time of recording of an administrative
offense,   his or her vehicle was in the
possession or in use of another person or at
that moment the owner was not in his or her
possession as a result of wrongful acts of others
at the time of an automobile accident.
Part 3, Article 6 of the Federal Law "On
Operative-Investigative Activity" (OIA) is the
legal grounds for secret (tacit)  obtaining
information about criminal activities (On
Operative - Investigative Activities: Federal
Law of 12.08.1995 of the Russian Federation).
According to this clause, video and audio
recordings, film and photography, as well as
technical and other means are used in the
course of search operation information systems,
provided that they would not be harmful to
life and health of people and cause no harm to
the environment.
ETHICAL & PRACTICE
ISSUES WITH
EVIDENCE AND
DIGITAL FORENSICS
The ethical issues raised by the data in these
devices parallels the legal concerns but may
also extend beyond legal limits. Under a
Kantian perspective on ethics, the principles of
equality and respect as applied to the private
concerns of individuals give some direction.
An extreme example of the ethical concerns
here addresses the publication of flight data
recording and event data recording of the final,
intimate moments of people-their last two
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minutes of life- who are caught in a system
failure that may lead to their deaths. (Bland
2015)
These issues reappear within the context of
our modern data recording technologies. The
ethical issues of the disclosure of information
may be separate from the search from that
information. Statutory regimes create different,
separate liabilities for the use or disclosure of
information, even where the acquisition of that
information may be permitted. But even if
there are no such prohibitions, it may not be
good conduct to humiliate through the
disclosure of information that serves no
legitimate governmental purpose. In the
extreme, this can invoke civil liability, but
even before notions of liability we must
consider the simple decency of actions both for
their own good as well as an early warning
system as possible conflicts with legal
prohibitions.
One challenge to the fairness of prosecution
has been the destruction of the sometimes
volatile VEDR and EDR data where a
defendant asserts it would have exculpated her
or him. (United States v. Gutierrez, 2011)
Although his argument failed, the federal
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Due
Process Clause of the federal constitution
imposes a duty on the government to preserve
evidence; however, that duty is limited to
evidence “that might be expected to play a
significant role in the suspect's defense,"
and the government acted in bad faith, a
proof burden that defendant was unable to
meet. (California v. Trombetta, 1984)
(Arizona v. Youngblood, 1988)
Another challenge introduced the practice
and ethical requirement for forensic
examination of the EDR. The defendant
asserted trial counsel's failure to retain a
forensic expert to contest the introduction of
the Sensing and Diagnostic Module (SDM)
and Event Data Recorder (EDR) evidence
indicating the speed of defendant’s vehicle at
the time of collision constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel and grounds for a new
trial. (Matos v. Secretary, 2015)  In affirming
the court of appeals noted that the defendant
had, in fact, had a forensic expert testify
generally to the reliability of the SDM/EDR
and that other evidence established his
speeding as to render his claims insufficient.
VEDR/EDR forensic data provide valuable
evidence in efforts at reliable fact-finding. It is
essential that their use be by those ethical and
competent in its analysis.
CONCLUSION
The issues regarding blackbox forensics will
continue to evolve as device forensics generally.
This is particularly the case as more and more
devices become networked into systems for
cloud storage of data, changing some of the
forensic tasks necessary in these cases. And
this will become increasingly complicated by
the implementation of cryptographic
technologies to preserve the privacy and
confidentiality of data collected in the systems,
for good or ill.
This will certainly be the case with
aviation flight data recorders and flight data
recording systems with the growing interest in
real time satellite transmission of flight data in
order to avoid the problems of lost flight data
recorders manifested in the Malaysian Airlines
flight 370 crash in the Indian Ocean and the
Air France flight 447 in the Atlantic Ocean.
Similar technologies are used now with some
high-end automobiles.
The legal ramifications of the changing
technology in our personal collection of our
own personal data are slowly unfolding
through both the case and statutory law. They
are beginning to reflect an understanding of
how even the simple localized retention of
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personal data can significantly impact people’s
lives such that it is the deserving of protection.
It is anticipated that this area will continue to
undergo legal and policy development as we
struggle with notions of personal autonomy
and privacy, public and private security and
the Internet-connectivity of everything in our
lives.
JDFSL V10N4 Cyber Black Box/Event Data Recorder: Legal and Ethical Perspectives …
Page 56 © 2015 ADFSL
REFERENCES
49 CFR Part 563, Table I (US).
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109
S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988)
AutoGuard Dash Cam –Blackbox, Hovanoo,
June 5, 2015
Batiste v. General Motors Corporation, 802
So.2d 686,687–88 (La.Ct.App.2001); Harris
v. General Motors Corporation, 201F.3d
800,802(6thCir.2000).
Bierman, N. (2012)  "Lt. Gov. Tim Murray
was driving 100 mph at time of Nov. crash,
may have fallen asleep at the wheel". The
Boston Globe. January 3, 2012, accessed
June 15, 2015
Bland, A., (2015) "German wings flight for you
9525: what's it like to listen to a blackbox
recording?" The Guardian, 28 March 2015
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart 547 U.S. 398, 126
S.Ct. 1943 (2006)
California Vehicle Code § 9951(c)(2) (US)
(2015)
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488, 104
S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984).
Cnossen, R, Heetderks, W,  Pettigrew, R., et
al, (2015)  “White Paper: Data Collection
and Mobile Technologies”    NIH Precision
Medicine Meeting (2015)
http://www.nih.gov/precisionmedicine/whi
tepapers/Data-Collection-Mobile-
Technologies.pdf
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct.
738 (1987)
Elmaghraby, A. & Losavio, Michael (2014)
"Cyber Security Challenges In Smart
Cities: Safety, Security and Privacy,”
Journal of Advanced Research 5, 491-497
H. R. 2414-Black Box Privacy Protection Act,
113th Congress (2013-2014) introduced
June 18, 2013, amending the Automobile
Information Disclosure Act of 1958 (US)
Kaste, M. (2014) Your Smart phone Is A
Crucial Police Tool, If They Can Crack It,"
National Public Radio, March 25, 2014
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.__,131 S.Ct. 1849
(2011)
Losavio, M., Keeling, D, Lemon, M, (2012) "
Models in Collaborative and Distributed
Digital Investigation In the World of
Ubiquitous Computing and
Communication Systems," UNESCO
International Conference on Memory of the
World 2012, Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada
Matos v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr 603 Fed.
Appx. 763; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2670
(10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished)
Mueller, P. (2006). Comment: Every Time
You Brake, Every Turn  You  Make–I’ll
Be Watching You: Protecting Driver
PrivacyInEventDataRecorderInformatio
n,2006Wis.L.Rev. 135.
On Operative - Investigative Activities :
Federal Law of 12.08.1995 N 144 -FZ (ed.
By 12.21.2013 // Meeting of Legislators
Assembly of the RF.1995 , N 33 , Art.
3349/
On Police: Federal Law of 07.02.2011 N 3 -FZ
(ed. By 12.28.2013 ) // Federal Law of the
Russian Federation . 2011, N 7,  Art. 900
Cyber Black Box/Event Data Recorder: Legal and Ethical Perspectives … JDFSL V10N4
© 2015 ADFSL Page 57
Paur, J. (2010) "March 17, 1953: The Black
Box Is Born," Wired Magazine March 17,
2010
People v. Xinos (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 637,
653- 654.)
Railway Technology, "HaslerRail -on On
Board Train Monitoring and Recording
Systems-Speed and Event recording,"
http://www.railway-
technology.com/contractors/computer/hasl
er/, accessed June 23, 2015
Russian Federation Code of Administrative
Offences of 30.12.2001 N 195 -FL (ed. By
29.06.2015 // the Russian Newspaper.
2001, issued  on  December 31
S.766 - Driver Privacy Act of 2015, 114th
Congress (2015-2016) (US)
Sakurai, K., ⁎ Yamamoto, J., Kurita T., Youji
T., & Kusumi, I. (2014), “Video event data
recording of a taxi driver used for diagnosis
of epilepsy” Epilepsy Behav Case Rep. 2014;
2: 24–25.
Sharp, D. (2003), "Autos' black-box data
turning up in courtrooms". USA Today,
May 15, 2003, accessed June 15, 2015
Smith, A., (2015) “U.S. Smartphone Use in
2015” Pew Research Center
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-
smartphone-use-in-2015/ (accessed July 9,
2015)
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952,957
(9th Cir. 2013)(en banc)
United States v. Gutierrez, 415 Fed. Appx.
870; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2801 (10th Cir.
2011) (unpublished)
United States v. Jones, 565 US, 132 S Ct 945
(2012)
JDFSL V10N4 Cyber Black Box/Event Data Recorder: Legal and Ethical Perspectives …
Page 58 © 2015 ADFSL
